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The neuropathologies of the self (NPS;
Figure 1) is a proposed broad grouping of
various syndromes in which the common
factors are that a demonstrable focal brain
lesion(s) or dementia causes an alteration
in the patient’s personal identity or per-
sonal relationships between the self and
the world. The NPS may include many
conditions (some of which are highlighted
in the Figure 1) but some of the bet-
ter known are the delusional misidentifica-
tion syndromes (DMS; Capgras and Frégoli
syndromes, DMS for the mirror image);
somatoparaphrenia; and phantom boarder
syndrome (Feinberg, 2001, 2009a,b, 2010,
2011a; Feinberg et al., 1999; Feinberg and
Keenan, 2005).
A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF THE NPS
The NPS differ from purely cognitive
disorders in that the mistaken beliefs
in NPS are more delusional, personally
idiosyncratic or bizarre, more influenced
by the patient’s motivations and per-
sonal relationships, and less tied to a spe-
cific domain of neurological impairment
(multi-modal). Although the misidenti-
fications, delusions, and confabulations
in the NPS entail many (Jackson, 1884)
negative factors—that is defects cause by
the absence of particular neurological
functions—the NPS also have numerous
positive, productive, defensive, and moti-
vational features based upon what the
brain can and does do. In order to take
into account both the negative and pos-
itive aspects of the NPS, I proposed a
model (Figure 1) based upon a network of
negative and positive factors and bottom–
up and top–down interactions within a
hierarchy of cognitive deficits and other
psychological functions (Feinberg, 2010,
2011a).
On the hierarchically lowest rung (level
1) are the cognitive deficits—depending
upon the particular syndrome—that play
a role in the creation of various disorders.
For example, in patients with somatopara-
phrenia, who most commonly display
delusions and confabulations about a par-
alyzed side of the body or arm “believed
or experienced as absent” (Gerstmann,
1942; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009), frequent
negative contributing factors to the syn-
drome include sensory loss and hemis-
patial neglect (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009;
Feinberg et al., 2010) that could con-
tribute to a loss of feeling of related-
ness to the limb. In a similar fashion, in
other DMS, executive dysfunction, mem-
ory disorders, and visuoperceptual and
visuospatial deficits have been implicated
as important, lower level, precursor, or
contributing factors (for references, see
Figure 1).
At the next hierarchical (level 2) are
some of the specifically self-related deficits
that are important in the etiology of
the NPS. Like level 1 factors, these are
negative factors, but at this level they
are specifically linked to self-related func-
tions. For example, in the development
of somatoparaphrenia, deficits in self-
awareness of limb actions (Baier and
Karnath, 2008) and spatial representa-
tion of the body (Vallar and Ronchi,
2009) have been hypothesized to play a
role. More generally, other level 2 neg-
ative factors that could contribute are
a failure of self-monitoring as part of
the frontal dysexecutive syndrome (Stuss
and Benson, 1985; Stuss, 1991; Stuss
et al., 2001, 2005), a “reality moni-
toring defect” (Johnson, 1991; Johnson
et al., 2000) an “anomaly detector” defect
(Ramachandran, 1995) or a deficit in
a hypothetical “belief evaluation system”
(Coltheart, 2005, 2007; Davies et al., 2005;
McKay et al., 2005).
We have suggested (Feinberg and
Keenan, 2005; Feinberg et al., 2005;
Feinberg, 2009a,b, 2010, 2011a) that a
critical negative feature at this level is an
alteration in the permeability or regula-
tion of the self-boundaries. This can be an
under-relatedness to personally significant
aspects of the self as occurs in Capgras
syndrome and somatoparaphrenia, or an
over-relatedness to selected aspects of the
world where the patient inappropriately
over-incorporates neutral aspects of the
environment into the self as occurs in the
Frégoli syndrome.
While levels 1 and 2 are comprised
of negative factors that are based upon
cognitive and functional impairments—
functions that the brain is not doing or
cannot do—on level 3 we find produc-
tive, motivational, and defensive positive
factors—that is processes that the brain
is doing and can do, often in response
to levels 1 and 2 deficits that often serve
as precursors. On this level psychological
defenses—processes that are based upon
psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theo-
ries (Vaillant, 1977, 1992, 1993)—are par-
ticularly important.
Psychological defenses can be organized
according their degree of psychological
maturity and their typical age of appear-
ance (Figure 1). In the hierarchical model
of the psychological defenses proposed by
Vaillant (1977); Vaillant (1992); Vaillant
(1993), denial, delusional projection, para-
noia, and distortion are the hierarchically
lowest, most primitive and most patho-
logical defenses. These are followed by
projection and fantasy that are considered
“immature defenses” because they make
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FIGURE 1 | Based upon Feinberg (2010, 2011a); Vaillant (1977, 1992, 1993)
and Cramer (1991, 2006). On the left is a hierarchical four-tiered model of
representative factors contributing to some of the neuropathologies of the
self. Some cognitive (level 1) deficits are specifically linked to certain
syndromes, while self-related deficits and positive features may be applied to
many syndromes. A temporal dimension emerges as syndromes evolve from
the interaction of multiple lower level negative and higher level positive
factors. This model is compared with the hierarchical model of the defenses
proposed by Vaillant (1977, 1992, 1993) and the developmental model of
Cramer (1991, 2006). Areas in yellow represent the corresponding immature
psychological functions across models. 1Levine (1990), Levine et al. (1991);
2Heilman (1991), Heilman et al. (1998). 3With reference to anosognosia and
asomatognosia see Geschwind (1965), Gazzaniga (2000); 4For the neural
representation of body ownership see Feinberg et al. (1990), Tsakiris (2009),
Vallar and Ronchi (2009); 5Stuss (1991); 6 Feinberg et al. (2005), Baier and
Karnath (2008), Feinberg (2009a,b), Feinberg et al. (2010); 7Johnson (1991);
8Ramachandran (1995); 9Davies et al. (2005), McKay et al. (2005), Coltheart
(2007); 10With reference to Capgras syndrome see Alexander et al. (1979),
Ellis and Young (1990), Ellis et al. (1997), Ellis (1998); 11With reference to DMS
see Christodoulou (1977); Christodoulou (1986).
their appearance later in child develop-
ment (Figure 1, column 2).
Along similar lines, Cramer (1991,
2006) proposes a hierarchy of defenses
along a developmental time line. In
her view, psychological defenses occur
as a necessary and adaptive part of
child development (Figure 1, column 3).
Cramer finds that beginning roughly
around age 3 the earliest defense to
develop is psychological denial and this
remains the major defense until about
age 7, at which point psychological projec-
tion (where the individual deals with unac-
ceptable emotions or thoughts by attribut-
ing them to others) becomes the dominant
defense. By about age 7 denial and projec-
tion are approximately equal and after that
point identification takes on an increas-
ingly important role (Cramer, 1991, 2006).
Also during the developmentally earlier
periods, fantasy—another productive
feature—serves defensive and motiva-
tional functions. Just as Vaillant considers
fantasy an “immature defense,” Cramer
(1991, 2006) points out that denial through
fantasy enables the child to cope with
unpleasant realities and Taylor (1999)
argues that the fantasy of imaginary com-
panions in children, a fantasy that has
many features in common with some of
the delusions in the DMS, serves a vari-
ety of adaptive functions for the child
such as coping with emotional trauma and
anxiety.
The immature defenses and functions
are the ones most relevant to the cop-
ing strategies and defenses of adults with
neurological injury and NPS (Feinberg,
2009a, 2010). In order to test this hypoth-
esis, I collected a representative series of
published reports and personal cases of
neurological patients with imaginary oth-
ers (N = 21) and determined the pres-
ence or absence of psychological defense(s)
and other potential adaptive mechanisms
in each case (Feinberg, 2010; for details
and narratives of these cases, see Feinberg,
2009a). In this series there was clear
predominance of immature mechanisms:
paranoia and wish-fulfilling fantasy were
the most common, each appearing in 9
(43%) of cases, denial was detected in 5
cases (30%), and projection appeared in 2.
Splitting, another primitive defense that
has relevance to the creation of imaginary
companions in children and is also associ-
ated with the adult neuropathology cases
(Berson, 1983) appeared in 2 cases and in
only 2 cases were none of these mecha-
nisms apparent or reported.
THE NPS, THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE,
AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENSE
Why would brain injury or dysfunc-
tion activate primitive defenses? Several
authors have hypothesized that increasing
cognitive skills based on brain matura-
tion leads to the progression from imma-
ture to mature defenses (Laughlin, 1970;
Lichtenberg and Slap, 1972; Elkind, 1976;
Chandler et al., 1978; Wallerstein, 1985;
Cramer, 1991, 2006). I have argued that
the disturbance in self-boundaries in the
NPS creates a de-differentiation between
inner and outer reality and the margins of
the self and that the immature defenses are
most likely to reflect this disturbance.
The neuropathological findings asso-
ciated with the NPS suggest a possible
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mechanism for how this might occur.
It has been frequently reported that
many of the NPS are associated with
frontal pathology especially involving the
right hemisphere (Alexander et al., 1979;
Feinberg and Shapiro, 1989; Förstl et al.,
1991; Malloy et al., 1992; Fleminger
and Burns, 1993; Burgess et al., 1996;
Spangenberg et al., 1998). For instance,
in one fairly large series, Burgess et al.
(1996) reviewed 41 reported cases of DMS,
confabulation, and reduplicative phenom-
ena and found the highest percentage
of cases had right frontal hemisphere
(44%) or bilateral frontal (39%) lesions
compared with only 9.7% who had left
frontal lesions. Feinberg et al. (2005; see
also Feinberg and Keenan, 2005) analyzed
cases of DMS or delusional reduplication
and found all twenty-nine observations
(100%) suffered right hemisphere damage,
while only 15 (51.72%) suffered from left
hemisphere damage, and in 28 out of 29
of the observations (96.6%), right frontal
damage was present.
In another investigation (Feinberg
et al., 2010) we compared cases (all with
right hemisphere lesions) with simple aso-
matognosia that showed unelaborated
errors regarding the ownership of the
limb, to cases with somatoparaphrenia
that showed more extensive delusions,
misidentifications, and confabulations
regarding the limb (the latter features
closely associated with the other NPS) and
controls with neither of these syndromes.
All patients with simple asomatognosia
or somatoparaphrenia, as well as con-
trols, had significant right temporoparietal
involvement; however, patients with
somatoparaphrenia had the overall largest
lesions and significantly more right frontal
involvement when compared to patients
with simple asomatognosia. Further,
while patients with simple asomatog-
nosia and somatoparaphrenia had more
medial frontal damage when compared
to control groups, somatoparaphrenia
patients also demonstrated significant
right orbitofrontal damage that indicated a
further role for right orbitofrontal damage
in this group.
The frontal (Stuss, 1991; Stuss et al.,
2001, 2005) and medial frontal (Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al.,
2006; Feinberg, 2009a; Feinberg et al.,
2010) regions have been shown to have
a significant role in several self-related
functions. Along with orbitofrontal cor-
tex, these regions are heteromodal associ-
ation cortices and part of the integrative
self-system that helps integrate the intero-
self system with the external environment
(see Feinberg, 2009a, 2011a,b). This region
is intimately concerned with the sense of
an integrated self and the differentiation
between the self and world.
In this context it is of interest that the
insula, a component of the interoself sys-
tem, has also been implicated in the etiol-
ogy of somatoparaphrenia (Cereda et al.,
2002; Baier and Karnath, 2008).
These findings further suggest that the
right frontal regions in particular play a
special role in these self-related functions.
The intactness of the self-boundaries and
the “ego”—defined by Vaillant (1993, p. 3)
as “the adaptive and executive aspects of
the human brain: the ability of the mind to
integrate, master, and make sense of inner
and outer reality”—play an important role
in the promotion of the mature defenses
(Vaillant, 1977, 1992, 1993). The promi-
nent emergence of the immature defenses
and fantasies after right frontal damage
suggest a particular role for these regions
in these “ego” (Freud, 1930) functions.
It is also logical that given that the
primitive defenses are largely based upon
verbal (productive) mechanisms and what
people say about themselves and others,
and that the delusions and defenses in
the NPS that emerge after right frontal
damage are also largely verbally expressed,
it is possible that the immature defenses
could be lateralized to the dominant hemi-
sphere. Further, one could speculate that
the neural structures that the mature
defenses depend upon may be lateral-
ized to the non-dominant hemisphere
resulting in a parallel lateralization of
the mature defenses to the non-dominant
hemisphere. Alternatively, the right hemi-
sphere may play some additional criti-
cal role in regulating or suppressing the
immature defenses. Along these lines, Salas
and Turnbull (2010) suggested that the
emergence of immature defenses in these
conditions could be caused by a failure in
the regulation of arousal and negative
emotional states (an “arousal regulation
capacity”) which is a component of the
mature defenses. If the capacity were lat-
eralized to the right hemisphere, damage
to the right hemisphere would impair this
regulation.
Finally, an additional question is how
in the course of neural development this
occurs. Based in part upon Cramer’s
developmental timeline (Figure 1) I have
hypothesized that in the normal course of
brain maturation there may be a devel-
opmental shift from immature defensive
functions and fantasies toward mature
defenses and the inhibition of fantasy that
critically depends upon maturational pro-
cess within the right hemisphere. Once this
“left brain to right brain defensive shift”
occurs, the immature defenses and the use
of fantasy are inhibited and the mature
adult defenses are more likely to dominate.
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